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Abstract  
The concept of phenomenotechnique has been regarded as Bachelard’s most original 
contribution to the philosophy of science. Innovative as this neologism may seem, it benefited 
from a generation of debates on the nature and status of scientific facts, among conventionalist 
thinkers and their opponents. Granting that Bachelard stood among the opponents to 
conventionalism, this article nonetheless reveals deep similarities between his work and that of 
two conventionalist thinkers who insisted on what we call today the theory-ladenness of 
scientific experiment: Pierre Duhem and Édouard Le Roy. This article, therefore, compares 
Bachelard’s notion of phenomenotechnique with Duhem’s developments on the double 
character of scientific instruments, and with Le Roy’s claim that scientific facts are fabricated 
to meet the requirements of theory. It shows how Bachelard retained Duhem and Le Roy’s 
views on the interplay between theory and experiment but rejected their sceptical conclusions 
on the limitations of experimental control. It claims that this critical inheritance of 
conventionalism was made possible by a reflection on technology, which led Bachelard to re-
evaluate the artificiality of scientific facts: instead of regarding this artificiality as a limitation 
of science, as Le Roy did, he presented it as a condition for objective knowledge.  
 
 
 
The concept of phenomenotechnique has been regarded as one of Bachelard’s most 
original contributions to the philosophy of science (Gaukroger, 1976; Rheinberger, 2005; Tiles, 
2005; Bontems, 2010). Innovative as this neologism may seem, it had benefited from a whole 
generation of debates on the nature and status of scientific facts. The very beginning of the 20th 
Century indeed saw intense discussions on this subject between several authors that we usually 
refer to as conventionalists—Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem, Gaston Milhaud, Édouard Le Roy 
and Joseph Wilbois—and their diverse opponents, among which were Léon Brunschvicg, Louis 
Couturat and Abel Rey. The project of reading Bachelard’s texts on phenomenotechnique from 
the perspective of these earlier debates has been carried out by Christina Chimisso (2001, 2008), 
who identified Bachelard as an opponent to conventionalism and heir of Brunschvicg. 
Undeniable as it is, this statement may yet be a hindrance to the appreciation of more positive 
aspects of Bachelard's relation to conventionalist thinkers. Among the authors who were rightly 
or wrongly associated with conventionalism, Pierre Duhem and Edouard Le Roy had indeed 
acknowledged the interplay between theory and experiment in a way that seems similar to 
Bachelard’s phenomenotechnique. Can we read that “it may well be the instruments that 
produce the phenomenon in the first place” and “instruments are nothing but theories 
materialised” (Bachelard, 1984 [1934], p. 13) without thinking of Pierre Duhem’s claim (1962 
[1906], p. 153) that “the theoretical interpretation of phenomena alone makes possible the use 
of instruments”? Bachelard’s conception of the experiment as production of phenomena could 
also find a precedent in Édouard Le Roy’s play on words: les faits sont faits—facts are 
fabricated (Le Roy, 1899b, p. 515). We could, therefore, switch our perspective and regard 
phenomenotechnique as Bachelard’s inheritance from conventionalism, even though this 
inheritance may be partly critical. 
Before any re-evaluation of that legacy, we will start by presenting Bachelard’s concept 
of phenomenotechnique and the way in which it was part of a critique of conventionalism. With 
that provision, we will then compare Duhem’s and Bachelard’s views on physical experiment. 
That comparison will show that their works share deep similarities, due to their common 
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insistence on what we call today the theory-ladenness of the physical experiment. We will state, 
however, that the two philosophers characterize differently the way theory relates to 
experiment: whereas Duhem conceives of it as a relation of symbolisation—“the relation of 
sign to thing signified” (Duhem, 1962 [1906], p. 20)—and borrows the notions of interpretation 
and representation from the tradition of hermeneutics, Bachelard founds his main conceptual 
resources in the vocabulary of technology and industrial production. That difference has 
consequences in the way both philosophers account for the objectivity of knowledge, leading 
the former to the notion of “natural classification” (Duhem, 1962 [1906], p. 24) and the latter 
to the elaboration of “technological realism” (Bachelard, 1984 [1934], p. 5). This will lead us 
to a second comparison, between Bachelard and Le Roy, for Le Roy is the first reader of Duhem 
who interpreted his work on physical theory in the sense of an artificial construction of scientific 
facts. That will allow us to follow the evolution of the notion of artificiality from the Bergsonian 
perspective of Le Roy to the Bachelardian concept of phenomenotechnique: it will appear that 
Bachelard’s main innovation in that regard consisted in reversing the epistemological value of 
artificiality from an objection to a condition of the objectivity of science.  
 
1. Bachelard’s Critique of Conventionalism 
 
1.1. Phenomenotechnique and Noumenology 
 
Even if phenomenotechnique has focused the attention of commentators, it may still be 
useful to open our retrospective and comparative inquiry by a brief presentation of this concept. 
“Phenomenotechnique” cannot be separated from another Bachelardian neologism: 
“noumenology”. Both neologisms appear in “Noumène and Microphysics” (Bachelard, 1970 
[1931]) and aim at elucidating the relation between theory and experiment in the development 
of scientific knowledge.  
Noumenology stands for a specific conception of the role of mathematics in 
experimental science that Bachelard elaborated progressively in his studies on physics 
(Bachelard, 1973 [1928], 2014 [1929], 1970 [1931]) and extended later to chemistry 
(Bachelard, 1973b [1932], 1968 [1940]). His study on the history of the physics problem of 
thermic propagation led him to formulate methodological precepts as to the use of mathematics 
in physics that he found in the exemplary work of the mid-19th Century physicist Gabriel Lamé 
(Bachelard, 1973 [1928]): rather than regarding mathematics as a secondary tool for an 
experimental inquiry, he presented it as an indispensable means of investigation of the physical 
world, opening paths to knowledge that would not be suggested by experience alone. The 
mathematical art of finding and solving equations follows central scientific norms, namely the 
exhaustive investigation of all rational possibilities compatible with a given set of explicit 
constraints. Bachelard gave great importance to such systematic investigation, for he believed 
the mind has a natural tendency to consider too narrow a set of possibilities and to be unaware 
of such a limitation (1968 [1940]). The concept of noumenology thus designates the use that 
can be made of mathematical investigation in experimental science, and the conviction that one 
should always follow all mathematical suggestions, even if they do not seem at first to have an 
empirical correlate.  
In Bachelard’s view, the considerable autonomy that noumenology grants to 
mathematics is only legitimate inasmuch as mathematical hypotheses are exposed to a thorough 
experimental testing. The notion of phenomenotechnique designates Bachelard’s conception of 
scientific experiment, and may be regarded as an original thesis on the nature of experimental 
verification (Gaukroger, 1976, pp. 216–223). That conception of verification is a paradoxical 
one, since phenomenotechnique does not only assume that instruments produce phenomena, 
instead of simply detecting them, but further claims that one verifies a hypothesis through the 
technological creation of an object that matches that hypothesis (Bachelard, 1984 [1934], pp. 
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12–13, 2004 [1949], p. 118). More precisely, Bachelard (2004 [1949], pp. 1–4) conceives the 
relation between noumenology and phenomenotechnique as a dialectic, an evolutive relation of 
co-determination, which goes as follows: one intends to verify a hypothesis by producing a 
corresponding phenomenon; however, this attempt faces difficulties, which, in the case of 
persistent failure, can lead to modifying the prior hypothesis. Hence, the production of 
phenomena and the theory that leads it perpetually enrich and correct each other.  
We do not imply that phenomenotechnique merely answers to the traditional question 
of the conditions for objective knowledge. Rheinberger (2005, p. 315) has shown that the 
implications of “what it means to be a scientific object in the sense of a technophenomenon” 
are much wider in scope. Indeed, phenomenotechnique “conceptualizes the relation between 
scientific thinking and technology in modern science” (Rheinberger, 2005, p. 313), revealing 
that each scientific object “derives its existence from a circuit that is at the same time material 
and discursive” (316)—which implies, first, that scientific objects essentially differ from the 
immediate objects of intuition, to which would correspond a rupture between common and 
scientific knowledge (318-20); second, that the scientific mind and its objects are bound in an 
open evolutive process which is inseparably both conceptual and material (316-9); lastly, that 
“the sciences necessarily became fragmented into different epistemological regions”, as 
“conceptual dynamics finally became inseparable from the phenomena in which and through 
which they expressed themselves” (316). To use a vocabulary posterior to Bachelard (Daston, 
2000), we could also say the noumenon and the techno-phenomenon are two sides of a scientific 
object: its theoretical and experimental mode of existence. The noumenon is a mathematical 
entity which gathers all possible configurations for a given set of phenomena; the techno-
phenomenon is the materialisation of one of these configurations (Bachelard, 1970 [1931], p. 
18).  
However, granting that Bachelard’s phenomenotechnique is much more than a way of 
accounting for the objectivity of scientific knowledge, we cannot deny that it also plays that 
specific epistemological role, and is worth being studied from that perspective, especially when 
we intend to compare Bachelard with conventionalist thinkers. Indeed, Bachelard (2004 [1949], 
p. 118) regarded the ability of phenomenotechnique to verify scientific hypotheses as an 
objection to conventionalism: “Scientific hypothesis, in the details of thoughts and techniques, 
is verified, is realised. . . How far are we from that epistemology which takes the hypothesis 
for a temporary scaffolding, for a set of convenient assumptions!” The insistence on the role of 
phenomenotechnique in Bachelard’s definition of objective knowledge may prevent a 
misleading interpretation, according to which Bachelard substituted “the concept of objectivity 
by that of intersubjectivity” and emphasized the “strictly social character of science” (Castelao-
Lawless, 1995, p. 57). Even though Bachelard (2004 [1949], pp. 12–64) did emphasize the 
importance of intersubjectivity in achieving objective knowledge, he never defined objectivity 
as intersubjective agreement. Such definition of objectivity, according to Bachelard (1984 
[1934], p. 11), characterizes conventionalism: “If we were entirely given over to society, we 
would seek knowledge in the realm of the general, the useful, the conventional: The world 
would be our convention.” He objects to this conventionalist claiming that the conjunction of 
noumenology and phenomenotechnique makes the scientific world more than a convention, 
“that which we verify” (Ibid.). Intersubjective control in the scientific community is only a 
means to ensure that the requirements of noumenology and phenomenotechnique are met, and 
Bachelard would have objected to those who equate objectivity with intersubjective agreement 
that the pre-scientific mind offers countless examples of intersubjective agreement on wrong 
ideas. As we will see, one of the objections that Bachelard raises against conventionalism is 
precisely that it fails to account for the difference between scientific and prescientific 
knowledge. 
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1.2. Bachelard’s Critiques of Conventionalism  
 
Since “Noumène and Microphysics”, Bachelard’s notions of noumenology and 
phenomenotechnique are conjointly presented as a refutation of conventionalism, according to 
which scientific theories are nothing but conventional hypotheses, and mathematics nothing but 
a convenient language (Bachelard, 1970 [1931], p. 14; 1984 [1934], p. 55; 1968 [1940], p. 51 
& pp. 120–121; 2004 [1949], p. 5; 1953, pp. 151–169). Before examining Bachelard’s 
arguments against conventionalism, some preliminary remarks seem necessary in order to 
specify what the term refers to. Conventionalism is a notion which emerged in the reception of 
popularized essays of Poincaré, and was retrospectively applied to a set of writers who had 
never used that notion and, for a part, resented being associated with one another—see for 
instance Poincaré’s (1909, p. 171) complaint, his critique of Le Roy (Poincaré, 1913 [1902]), 
and Duhem’s objections to Poincaré (Duhem, 1962 [1906]). As a result, the notion of 
conventionalism is to be used cautiously, even by commentators like Brenner (2003, 2004) who 
intended to prove that there is a genuine philosophical unity among the authors who were 
gathered under that term. However, Bachelard himself did use the notion of conventionalism, 
among many other broad and ill-defined philosophical positions, such as realism, empiricism, 
positivism, or idealism. Moreover, he mostly referred to conventionalism in order to criticise it. 
One could, therefore, legitimately object that Bachelard claimed an easy triumph over a 
caricatured adversary of his own making. We will indeed argue that there is much more in 
Poincaré, Duhem and Le Roy than the caricatured version of conventionalism which Bachelard 
rejected—and we will further try to prove that Bachelard himself had a more nuanced reading 
of these authors than his bold critique of conventionalism reveals. Nonetheless, these critiques 
of conventionalism remain important to the understanding of Bachelard’s own philosophy, for 
a series of contrastive arguments presents phenomenotechnique and noumenology as a way out 
of conventionalism.  
At first sight, Bachelard’s attacks on conventionalism may seem incoherent: in some 
passages, he condemns conventionalism as a kind of naïve positivism (1970 [1931], pp. 13–
18), whereas other texts present an accusation of idealism (2004 [1949], p. 5). To investigate 
this dual character of Bachelard’s critique, we may introduce a distinction between positivist 
conventionalism and idealist conventionalism.  
Positivist conventionalism, in Bachelard’s view, stands for the belief that there would 
be independent facts, and theoretical hypotheses on the top of them that come and go. That way 
of associating conventionalism and positivism may not surprise us, if we remember Maiocchi’s 
(1990, p. 387) remark, that what we usually regard as proper to the late 19th Century’s 
conventionalism—“Diffidence toward hypotheses, a phenomenalist view of science, and an 
instrumentalistic, manipulative interpretation of theories”—was already widespread among 
French positivist scientists of the 19th Century. In that positivist context, the devaluation of 
theories was part of a will to reduce science to pure experience. In opposition, Bachelard (1970 
[1931], p. 14) underlined the constitutive role of theory in scientific experiment, and even 
proposed to reverse the positivist opposition between arbitrary theories and necessary facts: 
“what is hypothetical today, is our phenomenon; for our immediate grasp on the real only plays 
the role of a confused, provisory, conventional data, and this phenomenological grasp requires 
inventory and classification. In contrast, it is reflexion that will make sense of the initial 
phenomenon by suggesting an organic series of research, a rational trail of experiments.” In 
that direction, Bachelard (1984 [1934], p. 55) criticised Poincaré’s efforts to demonstrate the 
mathematical equivalence of competing theories, inasmuch as they were meant to support the 
thesis that theories are just different languages to express the same phenomena: one may well 
prove that different theories are equivalent, it does not follow that mathematics is only a means 
of expression, for the link between theory and phenomena is, in Bachelard’s view, much 
narrower. Taking the example of tensor calculus in relativistic physics, Bachelard (1984 [1934], 
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p. 55) argued that it defines the phenomena and paths of discovery, to the point that “tensor 
calculus knows physics better than the physicist does”, according to Langevin’s famous phrase. 
Would tensor calculus be proved equivalent to another mathematical tool, it would nonetheless 
remain that “[w]ithout mathematics science could not even conceptualize the phenomena of 
relativistic physics” (ibid.). Against positivism, and the part of conventionalism which opposed 
the conventional character of theories to the firm ground of facts, Bachelard thus insisted that 
the definition of facts themselves depended through and through on theory. Paradoxically, that 
feature of Bachelard’s critique of conventionalism will make all the more interesting his 
comparison with authors like Le Roy, who extended that conventional character to facts 
themselves and therefore departed from positivism.  
What about idealist conventionalism? In Le Rationalisme appliqué (2004 [1949], p. 5), 
Bachelard drew a famous diagram, representing two paths of “weakened thoughts” spreading 
up and down from a centre. At this centre stood Bachelard’s philosophy, presented as a balanced 
view on the importance of both theory and experiment; the way up symbolized a growing 
overestimation of the role of theory, leading to idealism, and the way down an opposite 
overestimation of the experiment, leading to realism. In this diagram, conventionalism stood at 
the last stage before absolute idealism: forgetting of the constraints experiment imposes on the 
theory; conventionalism would regard theory as an arbitrary creation of the human mind. 
Granting the mind such freedom, it could make a step further into idealism in order to explain 
how these personal conceptions may still constitute knowledge, and finally identify the mind 
and the world. The idealist tendency of conventionalism would thus sin in overestimating our 
intellectual freedom, and Bachelard would correct that view by insisting on the role of 
experimental control, which leads to constant modifications of theory and prevents it from 
being arbitrary. 
In either case, according to Bachelard, conventionalism would misconceive the link 
between mathematics and experiment, either by overestimating the independence of facts from 
theory—in the case of positivist conventionalism—or the other way around—in the case of 
idealist conventionalism. 
 If Bachelard condemned conventionalism as an inadequate philosophy of science, he 
still suggested that it could provide an accurate description of the beginnings of scientific 
activity, where the relation between theory and experiment remains loose and unsatisfying. He 
granted to Poincaré, for instance, “that the mathematical formulation of the laws of attraction 
serves simply to specify certain instances of the general idea and to link together various of its 
consequences; [that] the law of surfaces is much the same, it, too, being an expression of 
something whose intuitive meaning is straightforward and clear”(Bachelard, 1984 [1934], p. 
55). The authentic noumenology, irreducible to the mathematical expression of pre-existing 
phenomena, would only appear in more advanced physics. To idealist positivism, he conceded, 
symmetrically, that the notations and classifications of chemistry were at first mere 
conventions, chosen for their convenience and with some arbitrariness, before the progress of 
chemistry both modified and motivated them to increase their realistic value (Bachelard, 1973b 
[1932], 1953, pp. 151–169). Bachelard, therefore, presented the evolution of chemistry as 
progress from conventionalism to phenomenotechnique: “The conventionalism of the first 
representations which were proposed in the 19th Century has been superseded by a technical 
materialism which realises its schemata.” (2004 [1949], p. 11)  
As he associated conventionalism with prescientific knowledge, Bachelard firmly 
condemned any description of the scientific mind in terms of simplicity and convenience, and 
sharply criticised what he identified as Poincaré’s “commodism”. He departed here from the 
benevolence of Léon Brunschvicg (1922, p. 446), who warned that the philosophical work of 
Poincaré should not be reduced to its vulgar interpretation, and granted that “the intellectual 
physiognomy of a Henri Poincaré is infinitely more complex and nuanced than most 
commentators presented it.” In Bachelard’s view, Poincaré’s commodism would insist on the 
6 
 
contingency of scientific theory, but would try to reduce this contingency by offering a principle 
of choice among several theoretical possibilities: the search for convenience and simplicity. To 
Bachelard, such advocacy of simplicity in an advanced science like contemporary physics 
cannot be but an obstacle to the progress of knowledge. In particular, Bachelard (1984, p. 38) 
condemns Poincaré’s “philosophical mistake” as to the use of non-Euclidian geometries in 
physics: “After Poincaré had shown that various geometries were logically equivalent, he 
asserted that Euclid's would always remain the most convenient, and that if this geometry 
should ever come into conflict with physical experience, people would always prefer modifying 
the physical theory to changing the elementary geometry.” He regards that decision as a kind 
of scientific conservatism, which intends “to immobilize the perspective of intellectual clarity” 
because it does not dare to quit its “rational habits” (Bachelard, 1984, p. 38); in contrast, he 
argues that the simplicity of Euclidean geometry was merely relative to a stage of our 
knowledge, and that it is one of the main interests of contemporary physics to compel the mind 
to use complex and counter-intuitive geometries. Indeed, as Bachelard (1968, p. 30) wrote, 
phenomenotechnique “must force the nature to go as far as our mind goes”, he also held the 
reverse to be true: “the mind must adapt itself to the conditions of knowing. It must create in 
itself a structure which corresponds to the structure of knowing”(Bachelard, 1968 [1940], p. 
123). The conjunction of these requirements defines Bachelard’s dialectic between mind and 
reality.  
As a whole—whether we regard it as an accurate description of science at its beginnings, 
or as a philosophical misconception of contemporary science—conventionalism would lose 
track of one of the two Bachelardian requirements: “no empty rationality, no scattered 
empiricism” (2004 [1949], p. 3). The articulation between positivist and idealist 
conventionalism would follow what Bachelard (2002 [1938], p. 30) identified as the 
“psychological law of the bipolarity of error”, according to which we cannot, at first, avoid an 
excess without falling into an opposite one: we would swing between positivism and idealism, 
as we want to maintain either facts or theory.  
Given these objections to conventionalism, a key question in the study of 
phenomenotechnique is to elucidate how it could pretend to overcome both positivism and 
idealism: how could Bachelard claim—in his objection to idealism—that theory should be 
grounded in the firm ground of facts, and at the same time—in opposition to positivism—that 
there are no facts independent from theory? And how could science actually achieve that goal? 
Paradoxically enough, given Bachelard’s critique of conventionalism, we believe that Duhem 
and Le Roy provided him philosophical resources to achieve that balance.  
 
2. Bachelard and Duhem on Scientific Experiment 
 
Duhem and Bachelard are traditionally opposed as the defenders of a continuist and 
discontinuist vision of the history of science—Duhem stressing the continuities between 
medieval and modern science, while Bachelard emphasizes the ruptures between pre-scientific 
and scientific knowledge, and between modern and contemporary science. Bachelard (1953, 
pp. 209–217) implicitly targeted Duhem among the continuists who chose to stay in the 
elementary zone of science (210) and to ferret out “influences” (212) in order to hide the fact 
that scientific progress “necessarily ‘bursts’ traditional epistemology” (210). There is no point 
in minimizing the depth of that disagreement, which also points to a political opposition, 
between the conservative Duhem and the progressive Bachelard. However, there is more to a 
comparative study of Bachelard and Duhem’s works than the opposition between continuity 
and discontinuity. The question of the relation between theory and experiment constitutes 
another fruitful but neglected angle for the comparison of these two authors. That perspective 
puts Duhem’s continuism in the background and focuses on his complicated relations with 
conventionalism.  
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2.1. Departing Duhem from Conventionalism 
 
 The legitimacy of including Duhem among conventionalist thinkers is a debated point: 
Maiocchi (1990) gathered evidence that “the historiographical scheme, that makes Duhem . . . 
the advocate of a vision of science proceeding on the basis of choice and decided by a criterion 
of simplicity . . . is completely wrong”, that The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory was 
actually written against conventionalism and the conventionalist interpretation of Duhem’s 
early writings. We may nevertheless wonder whether Bachelard himself regarded Duhem as a 
conventionalist thinker. The few explicit mentions of Duhem in his work provides us with 
contrasting elements. First, as Barchelard briefly commented on the Duhem’s texts on crucial 
experiment, he (1951, p. 47) condemned his “educated scepticism” (scepticisme instruit) and 
proffered a critique which resembles the one he made against Poincaré’s demonstrations of 
equivalence: any theory may well be made compatible with any fact, and proven equivalent to 
another theory; the actual history of science nevertheless follows definite paths, according to 
“epistemic values” which indicate what may or may not count as an experimental objection. 
That critique clearly identifies Duhem as a conventionalist. However, Bachelard (1973a [1927], 
p. 176) also used the Duhemian expression of “natural classification” to acknowledge the 
objective value of advanced heat transfer theory, and contrasted it with the conventionalist, 
anti-realist use of the notion of classification. Later, he praised Duhem’s abundant use of the 
notion of representation, for that concept could apprehend the relation between theory and 
experiment characteristic of “truly scientific phenomena” and constituted “the most natural 
intermediate to determine the relations of the noumenon and the phenomenon” (Bachelard, 
1968 [1940], pp. 63–64). From the rare mentions of Duhem in Bachelard’s work, we may, 
therefore, presume that he thought that Duhem belonged to a conventionalist background, but 
departed from it in his efforts to acknowledge the objective value of physical theory and the 
solidarity between theory and experiment.  
These elements put Maiocchi’s reading of Duhem in an interesting perspective. We may 
indeed object to Maiocchi and maintain that Duhem’s work did contain diverging tendencies, 
as Duhem intended to refute one or the other of his philosophical enemies (Roux, 2016). 
Therefore, it may not fit entirely with the anti-conventionalist presentation Maiocchi made of 
it—which may explain why many associated Duhem with conventionalism. However, it is 
striking how Maiocchi’s description of Duhem could apply to Bachelard: Maiocchi (1990, p. 
398) presents Duhem as an opponent to both conventionalism and positivism and a rationalist 
defender of the primacy of theory: “contrary to the flattening out imposed by the empiricist 
method of his predecessors, he had to avenge the rights of theory, showing how the ineliminable 
theoretical components present in every observation gave meaning to the scientist's 
experimental work” (Maiocchi, 1990, p. 387). Such an attitude could, indeed, define 
Bachelard’s rationalism: even though Bachelard (2004 [1949], p. 1) stated “the reciprocity of 
dialectics which go endlessly, and both ways, from mind to things”, he made no concessions to 
empiricism and maintained that “the epistemological ‘vector’. . . surely points from the rational 
to the real and not, as all philosophers from Aristotle to Bacon professed, from the real to the 
general” (Bachelard, 1984 [1934], p. 4).  
Our choice to consider Duhem from a Bachelardian perspective, in order to detect what 
Bachelard inherited from him, will therefore be reminding of Maiocchi’s reading. Neither 
Bachelard nor Maiocchi gave much importance to Duhem’s negative conclusion, that is, the 
impossibility of a crucial experiment and the limitation of experimental control it seemed to 
imply. Both insisted, however, that The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory contained 
valuable elements to apprehend the way theory relates to experiment.  
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2.2. Duhem’s Physical Experiment: The Material and the Symbolic  
 
The project to compare Bachelard and Duhem directs our attention to a neglected aspect 
of Duhem’s analyses on a physical experiment (1962 [1906], pp. 153–158): the concept of 
symbolic instrument. Duhem elaborated that notion as he commented on the experimental work 
of Henri-Victor Regnault, paying particular attention to the procedures which allowed him to 
increase precision in the study of gas properties. Duhem intended to elucidate a paradoxical 
feature of Regnault’s experiments, namely, the fact that Regnault did not hesitate to modify his 
measurement results, and even regarded such correction as a condition for accuracy. According 
to Duhem (1962 [1906], p. 156), that attitude would make no sense if a physical experiment 
were “simply the observation of a group of facts” and, therefore, proves that it is “also the 
translation of these facts into a symbolic language.” This double aspect of scientific 
experiments would be reflected in the double character of scientific instruments: each 
instrument would possess what we may call two modes of existence, a material and an ideal 
one. An instrument is a concrete entity—in the case of Regnault’s manometer, “a series of glass 
tubes, solidly connected to one another, supported on the walls of the tower of the Lycée Henri 
IV, and filled with a very heavy metallic liquid called mercury”—but the same instrument 
would also exist as an ideal, theoretical entity, inseparable in Regnault’s mind from the material 
one—“a column of that creature of reason called a perfect fluid in mechanics, and having at 
each point a certain density and temperature defined by a certain equation of compressibility 
and expansion” (Duhem, 1962 [1906], pp. 156–157). Regnault’s experiment would precisely 
consist of the comparison and adjustment of those concrete and ideal instruments, in order to 
legitimate and improve the relation of symbolisation that he has established between them. The 
value of physical theory would indeed depend on a matching process that we could sum up as 
follows: the theoretical instrument allows calculation, whereas the concrete instrument allows 
measurement. If the measured results are judged to depart excessively from the calculated ones, 
the pretention of the former to offer an accurate representation of the latter would be put into 
question. Such disparity could be diminished, however, if we could modify the theoretical 
instrument to increase its resemblance to the concrete one—hence the major contribution of 
experimental corrections to the progress of physics. Such corrections complexify our theoretical 
representations, taking into account a new set of parameters that turned out to have an impact 
on the experiment results, such as the compressibility of fluids or the variations of temperature 
and pressure in Regnault’s experiment. Duhem (1962 [1906], p. 158) finally compared the 
physicist with “the artist who, after finishing the line sketch of a drawing, adds shading in order 
to express better on a plane surface the profile of the model”: the progress of knowledge would 
essentially consist in such complexification and rectification of our theoretical representations 
of reality.  
 
2.3. From Symbolism to Phenomenotechnique 
 
If we consider Bachelard’s phenomenotechnique from the Duhemian perspective just 
mentioned, we may regard it as an insistence on the fact that the symbolic relationship between 
the ideal and material instrument goes both ways. Reconsidering that symbolic connection from 
the side of the concrete instrument, we notice that Regnault devised his concrete instrumental 
setting as a materialisation of a theoretical configuration he had in mind. Hence is it not enough, 
for Bachelard, to claim, with Duhem, that an experiment is an observation of facts and their 
translation into a symbolic language: we could go further and consider experiment as a 
production of phenomena that “bear the stamp of theory throughout” (Bachelard, 1984 [1934], 
p. 13). The Bachelardian notions of noumenon and techno-phenomenon can thus be regarded 
as a reinterpretation of Duhem’s symbolic and concrete instruments: the noumenon is a 
theoretical entity, and phenomenotechnique “tend[s] towards the effective realisation of the 
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noumenon” (Bachelard, 1984 [1934], p. 13) by the production of a phenomenon that would 
constitute its material correlate. The discrepancy between concrete and ideal instruments could 
therefore be reduced by modifying the concrete instrument to make it match the theoretical one, 
just as the other way around. Considering for instance the uneven thickness of the glass tubes, 
the irregularity of the wind, or other factors that we do not regard as pertinent for our current 
symbolisation, but that actually modify our experimental results, we could either choose to take 
them into account as causes of error, as Duhem (1962 [1906], p. 156) enjoined us to do, or try 
to physically prevent their influence by a technical intervention. Hence, admitting that a 
physical experiment is the methodical confrontation of a theoretical entity and a concrete entity, 
conceived as an instantiation of the former, there would be a complete convertibility between 
our technological efforts to produce a definite physical effect and our theoretical efforts to 
represent an empirical configuration accurately.  
What may have prevented Duhem from going as far as Bachelard in that direction—and 
claim that theory produces phenomena as its material correlate—is perhaps the phenomenalist 
position that lay behind his insistence on the symbolic character of theory. The notions of 
symbol and representation are indeed at the core of both part I and part II of Duhem’s Aim and 
Structure of Physical Theory, but, it seems, with two different philosophical aims: in the second 
part of the work, the notion of symbolic instrument is associated with what we call nowadays 
the theory-ladenness of physical experiment; however, the main purpose of the notion of 
symbolism in the first part of the book is to underline that the symbols of physical theory “have 
no connection of intrinsic nature with the properties they represent” (Duhem, 1962 [1906], p. 
20). This is Duhem’s famous claim on the distinction between physical theory and metaphysical 
explanation, according to which physical theory may offer “rational analysis of phenomena”, 
but should not pretend to reach “the reality hidden under the appearances” (Duhem, 1962 
[1906], p. 20). If we try to articulate both uses of the notion of symbol in Duhem’s work, we 
may say with Gaukroger (1976, pp. 215–216) that Duhem reduced the gap between theory and 
experiment, but conversely widened the gap between phenomena and reality. The comparison 
of Bachelard and Duhem may here shed a new light on a debated point in Duhemian studies. 
Many commentators (Bhakthavatsalam, 2015; Darling, 2003; Dion, 2013; Ivanova, 2010; 
Lugg, 1990; McMullin, 1990; Stoffel, 2002) have indeed questioned the consistency between 
Duhem’s phenomenalism and the notion of “natural classification” he elaborated to apprehend 
the increasing objective value of physical theory: that notion seemed to bend towards a more 
traditional kind of realism, in its concession that “the more complex it becomes, the more we 
apprehend that the logical order in which theory orders experimental laws is the reflexion of an 
ontological order” (Duhem, 1962 [1906], p. 26). Rather than a contradiction, it now appears 
that there is a solidarity between the concept of natural classification and Duhem’s analysis of 
physical theory as a representation, for the measure of the accuracy of a representation is its 
accordance with the order of things it represents. Hence, even if Duhem drew an opposition 
between representation and explication, the notion of representation does not overthrow the 
notion of truth as aletheia as much as it supposes it. In contrast, Bachelard’s notion of 
phenomenotechnique would have got rid of phenomenalism and realism altogether, for it does 
not define the objectivity of knowledge as the accurate representation of a pre-existing order of 
things. Bachelard indeed follows the progress of human experience from the subjectivity of 
common sense to scientific knowledge, and identifies the access to objective knowledge with 
the possibility of a phenomenotechnique: our conceptions give evidence of their validity as they 
prove able to lead a successful technical production, and are just as valuable as the technical 
production they allow. We could thus say that the passage from perceiving to producing equates 
the passage from subjective to objective experience. Instead of indexing the notion of 
objectivity on a pre-existing order of things, Bachelard (1951, pp. 216–223) even claimed that 
science is the progressive instauration of an order which is both intelligible and physical, as the 
progress of theory leads innovative technical productions. 
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The comparison of Bachelard and Duhem revealed that, even if Duhem underlined the 
interplay between theory and experiment, he somehow maintained a traditional conception of 
truth one he only displaced: instead of an adequatio rei et intellectus, he considered an 
agreement between theorized experiment and reality. In contrast, following Duhem’s indication 
that theory and experiment shape each other and adjust to each other, Bachelard regarded that 
relation as a starting point for a redefinition of objective knowledge. In that respect, we may be 
tempted to regard Édouard Le Roy as a middle step between Bachelard and Duhem: his original 
reading of Duhem challenged the conception of truth as adequatio rei et intellectus, and 
conceived scientific activity as a construction of scientific facts.  
 
3. Bachelard and Le Roy: Reconciling Artificiality and Objectivity 
 
3.1. Le Roy’s Bergsonian Conventionalism 
 
Contrary to Duhem, Le Roy’s inclusion among conventionalist thinkers is not a debated 
point. He even contributed to the perception of conventionalism as a unified movement, for he 
presented the work of Poincaré, Duhem, Milhaud and Wilbois as examples of a new approach 
to science which insisted on the conventional character of science (Le Roy, 1899a). However, 
Le Roy’s conventionalist philosophy of science is but one aspect of his work, and perhaps not 
the most important one. The resources that Le Roy borrows from Poincaré, Duhem, Milhaud 
and Wilbois aim at extending to science the analyses that Bergson already applied to common 
sense (Le Roy, 1899b, p. 515). We may consider, therefore, that Bergsonism provides a better 
key to Le Roy’s work than conventionalism, or, at least, that Le Roy’s work lays at the 
intersection of both orientations: as Pradelle (2012) shows how Le Roy’s conventionalism 
distorted his Bergsonism, we may argue, symmetrically, that Le Roy’s Bergsonism distorted 
his conventionalism. Moreover, that philosophy of science is but one piece of Le Roy’s system, 
which goes from the analysis of sensation to Christian miracles, passing by pure mathematics 
and evolutionary biology. We will, therefore, have to measure the impact of these other aspects 
of his work on his philosophy of science.  
We have few indications of Bachelard’s relation to Le Roy. He praised his mathematical 
work on the equations of heat propagation (Bachelard, 1973 [1928], p. 169), but made no 
mention of his philosophy of science, except in one particular text (Bachelard, 1972 [1960]). 
When Bachelard succeeded Le Roy as a member of the Académie des sciences morales et 
politiques, he was in charge of a traditional homage to the life and work of his predecessor: he 
then praised him as a promoter of human progress, whose precise knowledge of science allowed 
him to “estimate the power of reason” and “the creative activity of mind” (Bachelard, 1972 
[1960], p. 167). Even though the circumstances of that speech prevent us from giving it much 
significance, we may consider that Bachelard genuinely shared with Le Roy and Bergson an 
enthusiasm for the creative power of the human mind (Bachelard, 1984 [1934], pp. 176–177). 
From that perspective, the study of the way Bachelard reassumed Le Roy’s insistence on the 
creativity and artificiality of scientific facts, may contribute to the investigation of the impact 
of Bergsonism in French Philosophy of the 20th Century (Bianco, 2015; Bianco & Worms, 
2002; Wunenburger & Worms, 2015).  
 
3.2. Different Hierarchies for Perspectivism 
 
Le Roy’s first major writing, “Science et Philosophie”—published in three episodes 
from 1899 to 1900 in the newly created Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale—compares three 
attitudes of the human mind: common sense, science, and philosophy. It defines each attitude 
by its own norms and procedures, as well as by its objective correlate: the objects of common 
sense differ from the objects of science, as they both differ from the objects of philosophy. The 
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first similarity between Le Roy and Bachelard is, therefore, their perspectivism. When Le Roy 
(1899a, p. 376) writes that “there are no positive facts, but rather a positive mind to consider 
the facts”, he indeed seems to open the path to Bachelard’s investigations on the evolutive 
correlation between the mind and its objective correlates. The complete view on Bachelard’s 
perspectivism is the “epistemological profile” drawn in his Philosophy of No (1968 [1940], pp. 
34–43), which exposes what Bachelard intends by mass according to the different attitudes he 
adopts at different times of the day: the notion evolves as he considers a mass of sorrow, the 
mass of an envelope, the Newtonian mass, or its relativist and Diracian refinements—different 
kinds of masses which correspond to successive stages of his knowledge.  
Further, both Bachelard and Le Roy adopt what we may call a hierarchical perspectivism: 
if they both acknowledge, to a certain point, the autonomy and legitimacy of each attitude of 
the human mind, they make clear that one of these attitudes has a definite superiority, at least 
with regard to the achievement of knowledge. A significant difference appears, however, 
because they rank these attitudes differently: Le Roy gives precedence to metaphysics over 
science, whereas Bachelard condemned all attempts to elaborate a metaphysical discourse that 
would be external and superior to scientific activity. As a result, if it turns out that Bachelard’s 
views on science share similarities with that of Le Roy, we will have to explain how Bachelard 
nonetheless refused to regard science as a subordinate activity. Provided Le Roy only pretended 
to consider science for its own sake but actually wanted to prove that it must leave room for 
metaphysics, how did Bachelard separate the pars destruens from the pars construens of Le 
Roy’s study of science?  
 
3.3. Science Fabricates the Truth It Looks For 
 
Le Roy’s study of scientific facts is rooted in a Bergsonian argument from Matter and 
Memory: “That which is commonly called a fact is not reality as it appears to immediate 
intuition, but an adaptation of the real to the interests of practice and to the exigencies of social 
life” (Bergson, 1911 [1896]; quoted in Le Roy, 1899a, p. 379). Le Roy (1899b, p. 515) wants 
to apply a similar analysis to scientific activity. He starts by refuting the positivist conception 
of scientific facts, what leads him to motivate the etymological link between fact and facere:  
“Preoccupied with trying to establish a correspondence between things and thought, we 
usually conceive a fact as a piece of nature cut out with a cookie cutter. Facts, as we picture it, 
are like gemstones, hidden in dark and ignored corners, that we would have to search for a 
long time until we could grasp them, but which would suddenly appear ready-made before 
our eyes as soon as we would discover them. Hence the banal idea one only needs to state the 
facts. The very name of fact should suffice to overthrow the common belief: what has been 
made [factum] cannot be an immediate datum . . . Let us besides question a physicist in his 
laboratory: we will see if he does not have the strong and constant feeling of constituting the 
facts, informing nature, creating in the amorphous and continuous matter of the given the 
particular beings he observes.” 
If both common sense and science constitute their objects, Le Roy claims, however, that 
these two attitudes do not meet the same criteria: the construction of scientific facts is no longer 
subordinated to “the interests of practice and to the exigencies of social life” but to the ideal of 
perfect discourse, that is, the elaboration of a deductive theory that would start from clear and 
simple premises and include all facts as its consequences (Le Roy, 1899b, pp. 517 & 551–559).  
Among the examples that support this view is Gaston Milhaud’s analysis of phosphorus 
(Milhaud, 1896; quoted by Le Roy, 1899b): this chemical element has a scientific definition 
which specifies its properties, such as a 44°C melting point. Scientists would only consider 
what falls under that definition, and make abstractions from the various and variable properties 
presented by the real bodies we chose to refer to as phosphorus. Le Roy insists that the 
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determination of those qualities was not necessary—it was conventional—however, he 
concedes that this choice of qualities is not arbitrary, but motivated by the whole corpus of 
modern chemistry. Such arguments may seem close to Bachelard’s works on chemistry (1973b 
[1932], 1968 [1940], 1953), which gave great significance to synthetic elements, artificially 
produced with the indications of the periodic table. Bachelard did not regard those synthetic 
elements as a limit case, but rather as exemplary of all entities of chemistry; he even reversed 
the meaning of what was originally a critique of some illegitimate procedures of chemistry (see 
Dagognet, 2002), to claim the fundamental artificiality of chemical entities: “the great chemist 
August Laurent already said: ‘Chemistry has become today the science of bodies that do not 
exist’. One must give the existence to bodies that do not exist. As to those which already exist, 
the chemist must, in a way, recreate them, to give them the required status of purity, to put them 
on an equal level of artificiality [facticité] with the other bodies created by man” (Bachelard, 
1953, p. 22). The feeling of similarity between Le Roy and Bachelard’s philosophy of science 
grows as we consider Le Roy’s references to Bachelard in his later work (1929, 1935a, 1935b). 
Le Roy’s “Ce que la microphysique apporte ou suggère à la philosophie” is indeed very close 
to Bachelard’s “Noumène et Microphysique”, and Le Roy’s (1935b, p. 327) developments on 
spectrum analysis seem directly inspired by Bachelard (1970 [1931], pp. 15–17): would we 
consider spectrum analysis as a simple way to detect the activity and properties of particles, we 
would not understand the procedures which discriminate between the relevant and irrelevant 
rays, and rely through and through on theoretical assumptions. Both philosophers thus agree 
that scientific observation “shows as it demonstrates; it establishes a hierarchy of appearances; 
it transcends the immediate; it reconstructs first its own models and then reality” (Bachelard, 
1984 [1934], pp. 12–13). They both present this co-determination of reason and reality as an 
evolutive relation: Le Roy (1899b, p. 561) states, in terms very similar to Bachelard’s dialectic, 
that “the construction of science implies some combined deformations, some converging 
modifications of reality and mind; scientific truth results from a slow adaptation of the former 
to the latter.” Le Roy is also close to Bachelard in his claim that no definition of scientific truth 
can be found outside of that evolutive relation of theories and facts: Le Roy (1899b, pp. 359–
360) claims that we should get rid of the tendency to consider truth as “a precious metal in a 
gemstone” and realize that science must “fabricate the truth it looks for.” His main argument 
against the conception of truth as an adequatio rei et intellectus is that scientific activity cannot 
be assimilated to a representation or a translation since we cannot compare our productions 
with the original to estimate their resemblance. Hence “The only possible criteria are internal 
to science itself”, such as “coherence, stability, harmonious progress in a specific endeavour of 
the mind, growing success in our conquest of the world”(Le Roy, 1899b, pp. 560–561). 
 As long, therefore, as we consider Le Roy’s philosophy of science for its own sake, we 
may get the feeling of a far-reaching similarity with Bachelard: they both give primacy to theory 
in the constitution of experiment; they both condemn the naivety of the positivist conception of 
facts, as it remains unaware of the mental operations that are always already constituting facts; 
they also condemn all reference to a pre-existing order of things in the evaluation of scientific 
activity, regarded as a process through which both theory and experiment constitute each other. 
However, if both Bachelard and Le Roy depict fundamental philosophy of science as a 
“rationalist attitude”, they differ in that Bachelard plainly adopts this philosophy of science, 
whereas Le Roy criticises it from the external point of view of metaphysics. It would, 
nonetheless, be simplistic to consider that there is a mere change of perspective from Le Roy 
to Bachelard without measuring the impact of Le Roy’s metaphysics on his philosophy of 
science.  
 
3.4. The Impact of Le Roy’s Metaphysics 
 
 Le Roy’s Bergsonian metaphysics indeed pervades his philosophy of science, even 
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though the fundamental assumptions of that metaphysics may be opposed to what Le Roy 
identified as the rationalist attitude of scientists. When he depicts the inner philosophy of 
science, Le Roy refuses the notion of “given”, insisting on the construction of scientific facts, 
and refuses to define truth as conformity with reality in order to study how science defines its 
own norms. As a metaphysician, however, he rehabilitates an extra-scientific reality as a norm 
for knowledge. He supposes that the immediate data of consciousness offer a richer view of 
reality than science and common sense, which both operate a structuration and impoverishment 
of these immediate data. Le Roy (1899a, p. 379) compares the latter to “a great aurora borealis, 
something like a set of colours with an absolute heterogeneity and a perfect liaison, where an 
unceasing evolution of subtle and infinitely diversified nuances would take place.” Hence, he 
criticised the naïve views of positivism, which regard as given what is actually the product of 
a series of mental operations; but he did not get rid of the notion of given altogether and 
identified it with the immediate data of consciousness. The artificiality of scientific facts 
acquires, from that perspective, a negative meaning: science operates an artificial selection 
among those data, which may be legitimate according to its relative ends, but must be overcome 
to achieve true knowledge of reality. This leads Le Roy (1899b, p. 518) to separate science and 
objectivity: “there is in every fact a mysterious residual of objectivity, but it is the same one 
and continuous Given which lays at the bottom of every fact . . . What interests science is not 
what is objective in facts, but what is artificial.” This is also reflected in Le Roy’s attitude 
towards the representation of truth as a rare metal in a veinstone: whereas he condemned that 
metaphor as inadequate to represent scientific truth, he rehabilitates the image to describe the 
passage from science to metaphysics (1900, p. 54):“We took the composite ores that are called 
science and common sense; we submitted them to a purifying treatment; now that they are 
disaggregated, we can separate the metal from the useless scoria: that precious metal is reality 
captured and possessed by the mind.” 
 From that perspective, the artificiality of scientific facts constitutes an objection to the 
objective value of science: what is artificial is subjective, inauthentic, and perhaps illusory. We 
should recognise, however, that the situation is further complexified by the fact that Le Roy is 
somewhat ambivalent as to what we may call the metaphysical value of artificiality. On one 
level, he claims that consciousness should refrain from structuring perception in order to enrich 
its view on reality, and denounces the artificiality of scientific facts; however, on a deeper level, 
Le Roys’s metaphysics also intends to go beyond the separation between matter and 
consciousness, and claims their fundamental identity under the form of a single creative 
process. In that last respect, the artificiality of scientific facts acquires a new positive meaning, 
as an evidence of the creative power of the intellect. Le Roy (1900, p. 59) even borrows 
Aristotelian concepts to present the operations of the mind on immediate data as progress from 
potentiality to activity.  
 
3.5. Bachelard Among the Critiques of Le Roy  
 
 Bergsonian metaphysics was profoundly influential on Bachelard’s first philosophical 
work, his Essai sur la connaissance approchée (1928). However, his further work on science 
strongly rejected it, to anchor his philosophy in the process of scientific knowledge. How could 
Bachelard (1984, pp. 175–176) keep insisting on the creative power of mind when departing 
from Bergson and Le Roy’s metaphysics? In that regard, it is interesting to compare Bachelard’s 
position with the objections which were addressed to Le Roy’s philosophy of science in the 
newly created Société française de philosophie (1901) and in the Revue de Métaphysique et de 
Morale (Couturat, 1900; Poincaré, 1913), in the wider context of a tumultuous reception of 
Bergsonism (Brunschvicg, 1901; Jacob, 1898) and conventionalism (Rasmussen, 1996).  
 A recurring pattern in these critics is that Le Roy’s representation of science 
overestimated the creative freedom of mind, which would have prevented him accounting for 
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the objective value of science. Poincaré’s objections to Le Roy are exemplary in that respect: 
Poincaré (1913, pp. 325–333) admitted that a series of conventions is constitutive of scientific 
facts, which depend on our admitted theory; but he insisted that this liberty in the definition of 
scientific facts is limited by brute or crude facts (les faits bruts), constraining data with which 
every theory must comply in order to possess some objective value. These brute facts were 
presented as the invariant elements which allow competing theories to be proved equivalent 
and grounds their objectivity. All things considered, “all the scientist creates in a fact is the 
language in which he enunciates it” (Poincaré, 1913 [1902], p. 332), not the fact itself.  
 We may consider that Bachelard took an opposite direction to that of Poincaré: he did 
not enjoin his readers to consider that the brute facts were lying behind the constructions of 
science, but to assume the constructive character of scientific activity plainly. However, as he 
reassessed the fundamental artificiality of scientific facts, he put a new emphasis on the 
objective value of technology. Indeed, among Poincaré’s objections to Le Roy, Bachelard gave 
a great importance to the following argument: “However able the worker may be, his freedom 
is always limited by the properties of the raw material on which he works” (Poincaré, 1913 
[1902], p. 331). In his Essai sur la connaissance approchée, Bachelard (1928, p. 155) endorsed 
Poincaré’s argument on the constraints of technical production, and associated industrial 
development with experimental verification: “Technology . . . fully realises its object and that 
object, to come to existence, had to satisfy so many heterogeneous conditions that it overcomes 
all sceptical objections. It is factual evidence (une preuve par le fait) in the whole sense of the 
term.” This reflection on technology is all the more instructive as it appears in a book where 
Bachelard—probably influenced by Bergson and Le Roy—tends to denounce the artificiality 
of scientific objects, in the sense that the constructions of science would lose the trace of the 
real. From these premises, his chapter on technology contrasts science and technology, and 
paradoxically claims that the objectivity of technology is higher than that of the former. This 
reflection on technology and on the conditions for a successful production of an artefact has an 
impact on the notion of artificiality: it reconciles it with objectivity. The paradox of Bachelard’s 
first philosophical work is to combine Le Roy’s notion of artificiality in his critique of 
science—defined in opposition to reality, as what is ill founded, deceptive or illusory—with 
the new understanding of artificiality he developed in his study of technology. Ever since that 
first philosophical work, Bachelard regarded technological production as the most challenging 
way of testing theoretical assumptions. In his later work, he would no longer oppose the figure 
of the engineer and that of the physicist, but rather identify them, considering that science itself 
tests its hypothesis by means of technological production.  
 
4. Conclusion  
The trajectory from Duhem to Le Roy and Bachelard may be summed up in an assertion 
that Maiocchi (1990, p. 390) attributed to Duhem himself: the criticism of positivism needs not 
give way to sceptical conclusions. Duhem’s reading of Claude Bernard can be regarded as the 
mourning of a certain ideal of experimental control. Although Bernard had already stressed the 
importance of preconceived ideas in the elaboration of an experiment, he insisted that “so long 
as the experiments last, the theory should remain waiting, under strict orders to stay outside the 
door of the laboratory; it should keep silent and leave the scientist without disturbing him while 
he faces facts directly” (Duhem, 1962 [1906], p. 181)—otherwise, the very notion of 
experimental control would fall apart. Against that traditional view, Duhem stated that theory 
could no longer stay “outside the door of the laboratory”, at least in a mature science like 
physics. He drew some consequences from that fact, which may seem mostly negative from the 
old point of view, but also paved the way to a renewed conception of experiment and theoretical 
progress. As a reader of Duhem, Le Roy pursued the investigation of the evolutive relation 
between scientific theory and its objects and made room for an elucidation of the norms and 
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procedures of science that would not subordinate it to the traditional notions of truth or reality. 
However, Le Roy’s writings articulated a study of science for its own sake, which rejects all 
accusations of scepticism, and a critique of scientific attitude in favour of a higher kind of 
spirituality. Hence, the creation of scientific facts appeared both as an acknowledged dimension 
of scientific activity, and as evidence against the objectivity of scientific knowledge. The 
association of Duhem and Le Roy with a “crisis of science”, perceived as a fightback of 
metaphysics and religion against the positivist and rationalist tendencies of the 19th Century 
(Rasmussen, 1996), was therefore not unfounded if a little simplistic. In contrast, Bachelard’s 
optimistic rationalism can be regarded as a philosophy of scientific progress, which inherited 
from the positive aspects of Duhem and Le Roy’s analysis and condemned their critical 
character. His reflection on technology allowed him to take seriously Le Roy’s claim that facts 
are fabricated, and turn that objection into an argument in favour of scientific knowledge: would 
a theory actually lead the technological production of a definite object, it would prove by that 
alone to be more than an arbitrary convention. Following the theme of the artificiality of 
scientific facts and its evolutions, we could extend our investigation by a study of social 
constructivism, which occasionally referred to Bachelard’s phenomenotechnique (Latour & 
Woolgar, 1986), and wonder whether these developments simply renewed the opposition 
between conventional knowledge and objectivity, or tried to redefine both notions through the 
study of their actual combination.  
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